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Greater-or-Nothing
Constitutional Rules
John Fee†
Abstract
Greater-or-nothing rules exist throughout constitutional law and
constitute a growing trend. These rules give the government a choice:
do nothing or take the desired action plus do something more. Yet
often this “something more” is potentially more damaging to the
constitutional value at stake. For example, the government can
circumvent limitations imposed by the Free Speech Clause by
regulating speech more broadly than originally intended. This Article
unpacks this paradox and discusses justifications for greater-ornothing rules, particularly in an increasingly complex society.
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Introduction
Many constitutional rules force government actors to make a
choice: either do something comprehensive or do nothing at all. What
these rule prohibit is acting partway. Put another way, many rules
hold that a greater governmental power does not always come with its
lesser independent components. The power to do A plus B does not
necessarily include the power to do A alone.
Greater-or-nothing rules exist in almost all major areas of
constitutional law, and they often seem paradoxical. They include
antidiscrimination rules, rules prohibiting unconstitutional conditions,
procedural rules, rules that hinge on government-defined entitlements
or background laws, and more. While some arise from the text of the
Constitution, many greater-or-nothing rules are judicial creations.
Remarkably, over the last several decades, judges seem to have
become increasingly fond of creating and applying new greater-ornothing rules. Whereas an older style of constitutional law depended
more on direct judicial balancing of the costs and benefits of
particular government decisions and setting corresponding boundaries
on government behavior, courts today are more likely to insert
themselves into the decisions of other branches by taking away partial
options while leaving the ultimate decisions to the other branches.
This Article attempts to explain why that might be.
This Article also seeks to unravel the paradox seemingly attached
to many greater-or-nothing rules: that the government can get around
these rules by doing something more—something possibly more
damaging to the constitutional value at stake—but not by doing less.
For example, sometimes the government can get around the
limitations of the Free Speech Clause by restricting more speech1 or
by eliminating other public rights.2 Sometimes the government can
get around the regulatory takings doctrine by imposing greater
regulations on property.3 And sometimes the government can get past
the Fourth Amendment’s restriction on unreasonable searches by
searching more people in the same intrusive manner that is prohibited

1.

Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 50–51 (1994) (regulating the display of
signs can be unconstitutional if it “restricts too little speech because its
exemptions discriminate on the basis of the signs’ messages”).

2.

See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123–24 (2003) (finding an antitrespass ordinance constitutional because it applied to more than just
First Amendment speakers and it did not prohibit a “‘substantial’
amount of protected speech”).

3.

See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987) (allowing
an owner to build under conditions is unconstitutional, although the
government retains the power to deny development altogether).
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with one individual.4 This paradox calls for an explanation, one that
is often lacking in cases or commentary.
Although greater-or-nothing constitutional rules vary widely in
their spheres of operation and their specific mechanics, I propose that
there is value to addressing this large category of rules as a package.
These rules share a similar structure and similar advantages, and they
are vulnerable to a common kind of criticism. For these reasons, it
should be possible to make some common claims about them, even if
this analysis provides only a starting place for more particular
application. Having a common analytical framework for these rules
should make it easier to take the lessons that judges and scholars
have learned from some of these rules and apply them to other
doctrinal areas. Current scholarship provides no such framework.
I argue that greater-or-nothing constitutional rules make sense as
structural decision-making rules that depend on the comparative
advantages of the institutions involved. As applied by courts to
legislative and executive branches of government, greater-or-nothing
rules can be rational tools for maximizing public welfare. But these
rules do not appear rational if we pretend that any part of the
government can independently know the ultimate decisions that
governments should make to maximize public welfare. Greater-ornothing rules make particular sense as judicial tools for scrutinizing
other branches, which the judiciary neither fully understands nor fully
trusts, and as an alternative to either simple deference or simple
substitution of judicial judgment. When working properly, these rules
use the comparative advantages of politically insulated courts and of
politically accountable branches of government together to achieve a
set of results better than either could achieve alone.5
Because greater-or-nothing rules are founded on judicial
uncertainty as to specific policy outcomes, it makes sense that they
would proliferate in a society that is becoming increasingly complex
and that depends on greater specialization. They are often more
appropriate for a pluralist society that is skeptical of universal truth,
and that recognizes both the legitimacy and enormous range of
preferences on such topics as speech, religion, family, and the good
life. To borrow a phrase from Richard Epstein, they are “simple rules

4.

Compare Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973)
(holding that a “roving patrol” unconstitutionally searched car without
a warrant) with United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)
(holding that a security checkpoint that stopped every car could exercise
judgment in selecting the cars to be searched without warrant).

5.

This is loosely consistent with John Hart Ely’s seminal work,
Democracy and Distrust (1980), which describes constitutional law as a
judicial tool to enhance democratic processes of government rather than
standing in opposition to them.
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for a complex world”6—rules that are designed to manage the
incentives of competing actors, in this case government actors, in a
society that has far too many components for effective judicial micromanagement. They are also decentralized rules, which have many
advantages over centralized ones,7 and seem particularly appropriate
as applied to courts, the least politically accountable branch of
government. This justification has roots in public-choice theory8 and
depends on certain assumptions about different kinds of government
actors and government decisions. Identifying these assumptions
suggests not only an answer to why such rules exist and are growing
more common but also to why they are not always best.
Parts I and II of this Article will discuss the defining features of
greater-or-nothing rules and their proliferation in many areas of
constitutional law. Part III will explore various justifications for these
rules based on the institutions involved. Part IV will discuss how
these rules are well suited to the growing complexity of government
and society.

I.

WHAT IS A GREATER-OR-NOTHING RULE?
A.

Definition

Greater-or-nothing constitutional rules follow a simple form. They
provide that the government may perform some action (Action A),
but only if it performs something additional (Action B). A rule of this
type allows the government a greater, more active option (the power
to do A plus B) as well as the option to do nothing, but does not
allow the government some lesser subset of the greater power (the
power to do A alone).
Let us call A the restricted action and B the enabling action.
Depending on the rule, the relationship between A and B could be
reciprocal, such that the government is also barred from doing B
unless it does A, but this is not an essential feature of greater-ornothing rules. The enabling action could be something small, such as
when the Due Process Clause requires the government to give a
hearing when depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.9 Or it
could encompass a large set of activity, such as when the Equal
Protection Clause requires the government to regulate all similarly
situated people in order to regulate one person.10 In either case, the
6.

Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 21 (1995).

7.

See Todd J. Zywicki, Epstein and Polanyi on Simple Rules, Complex
Systems, and Decentralization, 9 CONST. POL. ECON. 143 (1998).

8.

Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, The Reason of
Rules: Constitutional Political Economy, at X–XI (1985).

9.

U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

10.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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government can do something particular only if it is willing to include
the act as part of something larger, sometimes massively larger.
Greater-or-nothing rules are an alternative to simply allowing or
prohibiting the particular action under review. And they seem, at
least in form, indifferent as to whether the government should take a
more active or a more passive option.
While some greater-or-nothing rules are explicit, many arise from
the structure and preconditions of the doctrines that courts apply.
For this reason, greater-or-nothing options might exist ex ante where
they do not exist ex post, it being too late for the government to take
the more active option in the case under review. And yet, for purposes
of examining the rationality of rules as regulators of government
behavior, the ex ante effects of rules are often most significant.
Consider, for example, the public forum doctrine. Suppose the
government fines Mary for distributing literature on a public sidewalk
in violation of city regulations. She may defend her case on the
grounds that she was acting in a traditional public forum (a city
sidewalk), and that she accordingly has a right to distribute literature
in that place. In the given case, ex post, it will be too late for the
government to change the features of the location to something other
than a traditional public forum, so there is not a greater option
affecting the judgment against Mary. But if the deciding court defines
a traditional public forum according to criteria that the government
has authority to change in the future, the court may effectively offer
the government a greater-or-nothing option ex ante. The legal
framework provides that the government must either allow the broad
range of public rights that go along with a traditional public forum or
eliminate enough public rights by qualifying the space as something
else.11 For example, under current law, the government might
eliminate a public forum by divesting itself of ownership or changing
the use of its property. In this sense, the traditional public forum
doctrine operates as a greater-or-nothing rule.
The alternative to greater-or-nothing rules are those that establish
fixed areas of impermissible government action. Let us call these
boundary rules. Like greater-or-nothing rules, constitutional
boundaries may exist in the form of bright-line rules or case-by-case
tests and standards. Either way, what makes a constitutional
principle operate as a boundary is that (a) the rule restrains the
government from taking some ultimate action and (b) the government
11.

Compare First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1129 n. 11 (10th Cir. 2002) (creation of a
privately owned pedestrian plaza does not eliminate a public forum
while a public easement remains), with Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1256–57 (10th Cir. 2005) (subsequently
vacating the public easement on the same, private plaza caused it to
lose its public forum status).
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cannot avoid the restraint by taking additional action. Unlike the
greater-or-nothing rules, the prerequisites and elements of a boundary
rule’s constitutional principle are beyond the regulated government’s
power to turn on or off on its own. For example, the Supreme Court
imposed a boundary rule in Roe v. Wade12 by holding that a pregnant
woman has a right to abortion during the first trimester of her
pregnancy.13 The Court also established a boundary in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey14 by holding that
the government may not unduly burden a woman’s right to an
abortion through regulation.15 The latter is more of a standard than a
bright-line rule, but still functions as a boundary by declaring some
type of government actions entirely out of bounds.
B.

Paradoxical and Nonparadoxical Rules

Some greater-or-nothing rules seem paradoxical, whereas others
do not. A greater-or-nothing rule is not paradoxical if the enabling
action would directly mitigate the negative consequences of the
restricted action. For example, the Takings Clause provides that the
government can take a citizen’s property only if it provides just
compensation.16 This is a greater-or-nothing rule because it makes one
kind of government action (taking property) conditional on the
performance of an additional action (compensation). The rule makes
sense on its face, however, because the enabling action directly
addresses a harm that the restricted action would cause to the
individual. In this case, the combination of two actions would cause
less harm to constitutional interests than one of those actions alone
would cause.17
By contrast, a greater-or-nothing rule is paradoxical if the
enabling action does not seem to mitigate the constitutional harm of
the restricted action. If the enabling action requires a cost to the
government actor that does not help the individual affected by the
restricted action, the rule may seem flawed. Why should the
12.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

13.

Id. at 163.

14.

505 U.S. 833 (1992).

15.

Id. at 895, 901.

16.

U.S. Const. amend. V.

17.

This assumes that the Takings Clause is designed to protect an
individual’s economic status relative to the government. For an
argument that the Takings Clause functions more completely as an
equality rule between citizens, see John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a
Comparative Right, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1003 (2003). Under the latter
perspective, the Takings Clause remains arguably paradoxical, insofar as
the government may still tax property owners and use the revenue to
take away their property.
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government get away with causing a particular kind of constitutional
harm just because it is willing to do something extra that is either
unrelated or adds to the harm? This is the common paradox of
greater-or-nothing rules. If the judiciary (or constitutional drafter) has
enough information to determine that Action A is harmful enough to
prohibit (whether categorically or on a case-by-case basis), then a
decision establishing boundaries seems most sensible. Alternatively, if
the action has enough potential merit such that it should be within
the government’s power, then to defer makes the most sense. But
either way, it seems puzzling to allow the action only when coupled
with extra action that does not reduce its harm.
Of course, whether a greater-or-nothing rule is paradoxical
depends on one’s perception of the constitutional value at stake. For
this reason, reasonable people might disagree as to whether a
particular rule is paradoxical. Consider, for example, the Supreme
Court’s management of the free exercise of religion. If the Free
Exercise Clause is designed to protect individual freedom to practice
religion,18 then the rule set forth in Employment Division v. Smith19
seems on the surface to be quite puzzling. Smith holds that a
government may restrict a person’s religious conduct, even conduct
that is central to that person’s religions practice, so long as it does so
through laws that are generally applicable and facially neutral.20 So
the government can avoid the restraints of Smith as applied to
religious adherents by making its regulations sufficiently broad and
religiously neutral. How does this serve either religious freedom or
general liberty if the rule encourages the government to make its
regulations affect more people?21 To the person who is denied the
ability to practice her religion, it hardly seems like compensation to
know that other people are similarly restricted. And to those others
whom the law encourages the government to regulate (beyond the
religious worshiper), the rule causes an additional loss of freedom. If
fewer regulations affecting religion is the purpose of the rule, a court
would more directly achieve this by interpreting the First
Amendment to exempt religious conduct from even general regulation,
at least when the governmental interest is weak.

18.

U.S. Const. amend. I.

19.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

20.

494 U.S. at 878–82.

21.

See generally Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck:
The General Applicability Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence,
26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627 (2003) (examining the general
applicability requirement in both theory and practice and concluding
that the requirement distributes constitutional exemptions in an
unprincipled and random manner).
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But if the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to promote
religious neutrality, rather than to promote individual religious
autonomy, the rule stated in Smith makes more sense. The rule
directly achieves this value whether the government responds to the
rule with more or less regulation. Recognizing greater-or-nothing rules
and their potential paradoxes may sometimes help in the simple way
of causing us to identify the constitutional purposes of such rules
more accurately.
Restating the constitutional purpose of a rule, however, does not
always persuasively resolve the paradox. For example, for the rule of
Smith, many would say that religious neutrality alone is not the same
as individual free exercise of religion and, further, that neutrality
ought to be a means of achieving religious freedom rather than an end
in itself.22 At a broader level, we should recognize that one can always
claim that a rule is rational because it accomplishes precisely what it
is structured to accomplish, but this circular reasoning is only
persuasive if one is unwilling to dig deeper. It is particularly tempting
to justify greater-or-nothing rules with large comparative ideals such
as equality, neutrality, and fairness. These are such regular terms of
constitutional law that they have become axioms that substitute for
deeper analysis. Those who are satisfied with stopping at such terms
are likely to see few paradoxical constitutional rules.
For those who prefer to treat fairness, equality, and neutrality as
means of maximizing public welfare in more concrete substantive
terms rather than as stand-alone axioms,23 there are many
constitutional rules that need further explanation to avoid the
greater-or-nothing paradox, including even equal protection rules.
Americans have a strong affection for fairness and equal treatment,24
often backed by an intuitive sense that equal protection rules and
other antidiscrimination rules of constitutional law lead to improved
public welfare, but it would be useful to unpack this intuition and
figure out if and why this works as a substantive matter. Analyzing
equal protection rules alongside other accepted yet paradoxical
greater-or-nothing rules can help provide an answer.

22.

E.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1129–52 (1990) (critiquing the Smith
standard as a measure of religious freedom).

23.

Notable critics of using equality and fairness as legal axioms include
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare
(2002) and Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L.
Rev. 537 (1982).

24.

See Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1992 (2002) (reviewing Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 23) (examining
ways that fairness as a preference is relevant to policymaking).
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II. The Trend Toward Greater-or-Nothing Rules
While some greater-or-nothing rules have existed since the
Constitution’s ratification, the Supreme Court has become especially
fond of making new ones in recent decades. Among the new greateror-nothing rules are antidiscrimination rules, rules against
unconstitutional conditions, rules based on government-controlled
background conditions, procedural rules, and more. They seem to
have proliferated in almost every area of constitutional law, including
those that are based on constitutional clauses that appear on their
face to offer no greater-power options. The new preference for greateror-nothing rules seems to transcend liberal-conservative ideologies on
the Court: they were featured prominently in the Warren Court and
have continued to expand in the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts
Courts. And among the Justices who seem to prefer greater-ornothing rules the most are those as opposite as Justices Scalia and
Brennan.
Part of the proliferation of greater-or-nothing rules may be due to
the simple growth of constitutional law; there are many more cases
and sub-categories of constitutional law than there used to be.
However, it also appears that the Supreme Court’s style of
jurisprudence has significantly changed. Whereas the Supreme Court
used to be strongly inclined to impose simple boundaries for
government behavior based on either a balancing of interests or more
formal methods, it now seems to prefer a more conditional approach,
identifying a part of the analysis that is for the court to decide while
leaving government regulators a range of options. The result has been
a massive growth of greater-or-nothing rules.
A. Antidiscrimination Rules

The most obvious example of greater-or-nothing rules are the
many antidiscrimination rules of constitutional law. By
antidiscrimination rules, I mean not only rules that prohibit
discrimination between people but any rule that recognizes disfavored
distinctions or underinclusiveness in the law. These rules encourage
the government to treat certain classes of people, products, behavior,
or situations equivalently or face heightened scrutiny for doing
otherwise. Such rules can encourage the government to broaden its
regulations to avoid constitutional restraint.
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence exemplifies this kind of
rule, although it is not the only source. What is remarkable about
equal protection law is not that it imposes greater-or-nothing choices,
which one should expect from the text of the Fourteenth Amendment,
but rather that the Court has made it so dominant in the field of
constitutional law since the 1950s. This represents a judicial choice. A
century ago, despite having the same Equal Protection Clause, the
Supreme Court allowed many forms of discrimination that today are
not allowed. Beginning in the 1950s, the Warren Court created a
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revolution in equal protection law with Brown v. Board of Education25
and other civil rights era decisions, giving new focus to questions of
discrimination in constitutional law. Since then, equal protection law
has continued to expand and increase its rigor. New areas of
application include sex and gender,26 political representation by
geography,27 sexual orientation,28 language,29 disability,30 and class-ofone cases.31 We have moved a long way from Plessy v. Ferguson32 to
Bush v. Gore.33 If one takes a step back, the breadth and
pervasiveness of equal protection law today compared to an earlier era
is astonishing and illustrates the kind of comparative jurisprudence
that the Supreme Court has chosen to favor. This has made it more
difficult than ever for the government to regulate one or a few people
as compared to many. This development has come at roughly the
same time as the Court has moved away from setting substantive
boundary-type limits on the government’s power to regulate the
economy, as it did during the era of Lochner v. New York.34
Perhaps more remarkably, antidiscrimination has become
dominant in Free Speech Clause and Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence, even though the First Amendment says nothing about
equality, neutrality, or discrimination. Today, one of the most
important threshold questions in a freedom of speech case is whether
the government has regulated speech on the basis of content, or, in
other words, whether the law differentiates between different
categories of expression on the basis of content elements, such as
words, viewpoint, subject matter, or communicative impact.35 This
means that a regulation that applies to all speech regardless of
content will usually avoid strict scrutiny and is likely to be
constitutional,36 but if the same regulation makes content-based
25.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

26.

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).

27.

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

28.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

29.

Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966).

30.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).

31.

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).

32.

163 U.S. 537 (1896).

33.

531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curium).

34.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

35.

See John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1103, 1122–
30 (2005).

36.

See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (holding
constitutional a content-neutral restriction on megaphones).
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exceptions, it will rarely survive constitutional review.37 This
framework means that a speech regulation will often fail
constitutional muster because it does not regulate enough speech.
This is so, even though the relevant clause of the First Amendment,
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”38
seems to work in only one direction, toward greater permissibility for
speech.
But content discrimination has not always been a focus in
freedom of speech law.39 The Supreme Court’s freedom of speech cases
prior to the 1960s do not mention content discrimination but rather
depend on a kind of boundary analysis. In the earlier twentieth
century, speech cases turned essentially on whether someone’s
expression counted as “protected” speech and, if so, whether the
government’s regulation was reasonable.40 This approach was a kind
of balancing framework that factored the individual’s interest and the
government’s interest, but it did not depend much on how the
government treated similarly situated speakers or speech content.
In fact, it was not until the 1970s that the Supreme Court began
saying in clear terms that a law is presumed unconstitutional if it
regulates on the basis of content.41 In Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley,42 the Court went so far as to describe this as the primary
concern of the First Amendment. “[A]bove all else,” the Court said,
“the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content.”43 Since Mosley, the Supreme Court has continued to
extend the rule against speech discrimination with rigor,44 while
seemingly relaxing its scrutiny of nondiscriminatory speech

37.

See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818
(2000) (“It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its
content will ever be permissible.”).

38.

U.S. Const. amend. I.

39.

For a more thorough overview of the change of focus in speech
jurisprudence, see Fee, supra note 35, at 1116–22.

40.

See id. at 1116–17 (describing the shift toward antidiscrimination in free
speech law in the latter twentieth century).

41.

See e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (describing the
“usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or
content of individual expression”).

42.

408 U.S. 92 (1972).

43.

Id. at 95.

44.

E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (finding
that content discrimination in the regulation of even unprotected action,
such as vandalism or threats, makes a law unconstitutional).
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regulations. In today’s free speech jurisprudence, balancing matters
less while the presence or absence of discrimination matters more.45
The Supreme Court’s changes to Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence were similar but more dramatic. Prior to 1989, free
exercise of religion primarily functioned as a boundary between
individuals and government; it asked whether a law substantially
burdened a person’s religious exercise and, if so, whether it served a
compelling governmental interest.46 But in Employment Division v.
Smith,47 the Supreme Court surprised many observers by holding that
individual and governmental interests do not matter as long as a law
is sufficiently broad and religiously neutral.48 While thus reducing
religious freedom in one sense, the Court followed Smith by increasing
its scrutiny of underinclusive laws in Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.49 In Lukumi, the Court made clear that
the threshold questions of neutrality and general applicability are
rigorous ones that take into account both legislative history and
underinclusivity.50
Dormant Commerce Clause51 jurisprudence has moved in a similar
direction since its origins: toward greater emphasis on discrimination
and less on boundaries and balancing. The underlying principle of the
Dormant Commerce Clause is that states may not impose regulations
that substantially burden interstate commerce. Originally, this did
45.

Several First Amendment scholars claim that government neutrality,
rather than individual substantive freedom, is the sole or dominant goal
of the Free Speech Clause. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413 (1996); Jed Rubenfeld, The First
Amendment’s Purpose, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 767 (2001).

46.

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).

47.

494 U.S. 872 (1990). Congress responded to Smith and “attempt[ed] to
accord heightened statutory protection to religious exercise” by passing
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which was subsequently
ruled unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments.
Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1655–56 (2011) (citing City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). Congress then passed the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. Id.

48.

494 U.S. at 876–80 (“[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not
the object of the [law] but merely an incidental effect of a generally
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not
been offended.”).

49.

508 U.S. 520 (1993).

50.

Id. at 531–46. In Lukumi, the Court held unconstitutional a city
ordinance prohibiting the unnecessary ritual slaughter of animals.
Among the ordinance’s constitutional flaws was the fact that it
exempted some secular purposes for slaughtering animals but did not
exempt religious purposes. Id. at 542, 546.

51.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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not seem to have much to do with discrimination against interstate
commerce relative to intrastate commerce but rather, and more
simply, whether a state regulation went too far and addressed matters
more appropriate for federal regulation.52 Over time, however, and
particularly since the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court has
increasingly applied the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as a rule
that prohibits discrimination against out-of-state interests. A
regulation that exempts in-state businesses will rarely survive
constitutional scrutiny,53 whereas a regulation that contains no such
exemptions is likely to be constitutional.54
Even the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment’s Search and
Seizure Clause55 shows the influence of modern antidiscrimination
thinking. The text of the Fourth Amendment prohibits only
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” which seems to have little to do
with whether a law is underinclusive or discriminatory.56 And yet,
beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court established two separate
lines of search-and-seizure cases; one in which the government action
involved an ad hoc search of one person and one in which the search
was part of broad consistent scheme affecting many in the same way.
When, for example, government officers establish a checkpoint at
which all peoples or vehicles are stopped consistently, a lower
standard of review applies, even though the search may be equally
intrusive and affect more people.57
B. Rules Regarding Government Property and
Government-Controlled Background Criteria

The trend toward antidiscrimination rules in modern
constitutional law is unmistakable and alone deserves greater
scholarly focus, but the Supreme Court’s modern preference for
52.

E.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 577
(1886); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 321 (1851).

53.

See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)
(“[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation,
a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”).

54.

See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970) (holding
an Arizona law constitutional insofar as it (a) required produce grown
and packaged within the state to be labeled with the state name and
(b) “forbid the misleading use of its name on produce that was grown or
packaged elsewhere”); see also James D. Fox, Note, State Benefits
Under the Pike Balancing Test of the Dormant Commerce Clause:
Putative or Actual?, 1 Ave Maria L. Rev. 175, 206–13 (2003)
(proposing that the Pike balancing test should be considered as simply
rational basis scrutiny).

55.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

56.

Id.

57.

See cases cited supra note 4.
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greater-or-nothing rules extends further than this. The Supreme Court
has also favored new greater-or-nothing rules that depend on how the
government uses or controls its property or other background
conditions that the government controls.
The traditional public forum doctrine fits squarely within this
trend at the Supreme Court. In the nineteenth century, when
confronted with whether free speech rights exist on government
property, the Supreme Court rejected a greater-or-nothing approach
and instead saw the analysis simply as one of boundaries.58 The Court
found that since the government possesses the greater power to
control and dispose of public property, it must necessarily have the
lesser power as a proprietor to prohibit speech there.59 A generation
later, however, the Supreme Court overruled this line of thought when
it held that government dedication of property as a street or sidewalk
comes with constitutional obligations so long as the government
continues to dedicate the property in a particular manner.60 The
Supreme Court’s more recent cases have expanded this doctrine and
considered what it takes to establish or eliminate a traditional public
forum, thus making the greater-or-nothing aspect of the public forum
doctrine more explicit and even deliberate.61
The Supreme Court has also added greater-or-nothing rules by
recognizing exceptions to constitutional rules based on governmentcontrolled criteria. For example, there exists an exception to the rule
disfavoring content-based speech regulation in situations where the
58.

See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897) (comparing the
legislature’s conditional prohibition on public speaking to the right of an
individual to forbid another individual to enter his house).

59.

Id. at 48 (positing that “the greater power contains the lesser”).

60.

E.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) (“[O]ne who is
rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries
with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views
in an orderly fashion. . . . [including] by handbills and literature as well
as by the spoken word.”); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S.
496, 518 (1939) (Stone, J.) (holding void sections of an ordinance that
prohibited individuals from distributing printed materials and holding
public meetings in streets and other public places); Schneider v. Town
of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (“So long as legislation . . . does
not abridge the constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to
impart information through speech or the distribution of literature, it
may lawfully regulate the conduct of those using the streets.”).

61.

See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 678–80 (1992) (discussing the “forum based” approach to assessing
restrictions of speech on government property); id. at 699–700
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the government may not remove
a public forum’s designation and “by fiat assert broad control over
speech”); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725–30 (1990)
(plurality opinion) (discussing the characteristics of the Postal Service
sidewalk at issue and ultimately concluding that it was a nonpublic forum).
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government identifies the favored category of speech as its own.62 In
other words, the government may sometimes intentionally skew a
speech environment toward certain favored viewpoints if the
government is willing to make clear that doing so is the very purpose
of the program under review.63 Similarly, an exception to regulatorytakings rules applies where background principles of state law allow
the kind of government action in question.64 This gives state
governments ex ante control over the scope of the regulatory takings
doctrine applicable to them. And constitutional rules that prevent
overregulation of commercial speech allow the government to prohibit
advertising of illegal transactions—a category that can be created by
state law.65 For example, if a state makes the sale of alcohol illegal,
then it can also prohibit the advertising of alcohol sales. But its power
to restrict advertising will be limited if it allows alcohol sales to
remain legal.66 The greater power to prohibit sales and advertising
does not include the lesser power to prohibit advertising alone.
C. Rules Banning Unconstitutional Conditions

Another large area of expanding greater-or-nothing rules are those
against unconstitutional conditions. Unconstitutional-condition rules
prohibit the government from offering regulatory exemptions or
government benefits with coercive conditions attached. They are
greater-or-nothing rules if the government retains the greater power
to deny the benefit or regulatory privilege altogether while being
constitutionally restrained from offering it conditionally as an
incentive for something that the government could not compel
directly.
The Supreme Court has seemed to favor these kinds of rules in
recent decades. For example, in Nollan v. California Coastal
62.

Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009)
(holding that the placement of a privately donated monument in a
public park is government speech, and, thus, not subject to the Free
Speech Clause).

63.

For more on government speech, see Fee, supra note 35, at 1136–40
(describing the government-supported viewpoints and public education
exceptions to the First Amendment’s rule against content
discrimination).

64.

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031–32 (1992)
(remanding for determination of the background principles of South
Carolina nuisance or property law that could impact whether the
contested government prohibition is a taking).

65.

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980) (“The government may ban forms of
communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it or
commercial speech related to illegal activity.” (citations omitted)).

66.

44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996).
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Commission,67 the Supreme Court held that the government violated
the Takings Clause by conditioning land use permissions on the
granting of unrelated property interests to the government.68 The
government can often deny an owner’s proposed land use altogether,
but it cannot offer a deal unless it meets certain criteria.69 Likewise,
the government may refuse to offer a job to any person, but, since the
mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court has limited the
government’s ability to coerce private decisions through offers of
employment.70 And most recently, the Supreme Court held that while
the Federal Government may condition federal grants to states in
many ways, there is a limit to the use of these coercive conditions
where the States lack realistic choices.71 According to this principle,
the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the Affordable Care Act
that impose new Medicaid requirements on states.72
Finally, the Supreme Court in recent decades has dramatically
increased the procedural rigor by which governments must prove that
a person deserves to be punished or to lose some entitlement, thus
representing yet another expansion area for greater-or-nothing rules.
For example, consider the constitutional criminal procedure revolution
of the mid-twentieth century73 or the Supreme Court’s extension of
67.

483 U.S. 825 (1987).

68.

Id. at 841–42.

69.

See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (adding a “rough
proportionality” requirement, and thus more rigor, to the Nollan rule).

70.

E.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626–29 (1978) (holding
unconstitutional a state rule prohibiting ministers from serving as
legislators); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265–68 (1967)
(holding unconstitutional a law that broadly prohibited any member of
the Communist party from employment in a defense facility); Elfbrandt
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 16–19 (1966) (holding unconstitutional an
overbroad law that required all state employees to take an oath of
loyalty and threatened discharge from public office any oath signatory
who associated with a group seeking to overthrow the government).

71.

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012)
(holding that the federal government cannot withdraw a state’s existing
Medicaid funds for failure to participate in the new program set forth in
the Affordable Care Act).

72.

Id.

73.

See, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137–39 (1979) (holding that
trials for nonpetty defenses must be decided unanimously if tried by sixmember juries); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment applies to state criminal cases for
nonpetty offenses); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (“[T]he
government seeking to punish an individual [must] produce the evidence
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel,
simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth[, including during
a custodial interrogation].”); see also Corinna Barrett Lain,
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due process to new classes of property in the 1970s, including
government jobs74 and regulatory entitlements.75 These rules involving
unconstitutional conditions are greater-or-nothing rules because they
leave open to the government various ex ante options to avoid
procedures in the long run, such as eliminating elements of offenses
that are difficult to prove and relying instead on prosecutorial
discretion, changing elements into sentencing factors,76 increasing the
statutory punishment for offenses to pressure defendants into plea
bargains, and legislating away regulatory entitlements. Like many
other new greater-or-nothing rules, these particular rules have
changed the dynamic of government decisions in important ways
while declaring few outcomes to be categorically off limits.

III. Why Greater-or-Nothing Rules?
Why might the Supreme Court prefer greater-or-nothing rules in
constitutional law? In this section, I will outline some reasons why
greater-or-nothing rules can make sense under the right assumptions,
producing outcomes for law that are preferable to either boundary
rules or deference to other branches. A common theme of these
justifications is the dependence on comparative advantages of
politically insulated courts and other parts of government. As the gap
between these comparative advantages increases with society’s
growing complexity, it makes sense that courts would turn
increasingly to greater-or-nothing rules.

Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role
in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1361 (2004)
(describing the Warren Court’s criminal procedure holdings in a
historical legal context).
74.

See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972)
(acknowledging that tenured public college professors, untenured college
professors and staff members discharged during their contract terms,
and teachers with “a clearly implied promise of continued employment”
possess “interests in continued employment that are safeguarded by due
process”).

75.

See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that an individual’s
receipt of welfare benefits constituted an interest that is protected by
procedural due process); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976)
(noting that due process applies where the government seeks to
terminate an individual’s Social Security disability benefits).

76.

See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491–97 (2000) (rejecting a
New Jersey law that allowed a defendant first to be convicted of a
second-degree offense by a jury that found guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt and then to receive punishment equivalent to that of a firstdegree offense after a judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the defendant acted with the requisite “purpose”).
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A.

Assumptions and Methodology

For these purposes, let us assume a realist and consequentialist
approach to constitutional law. That is to say, let us assume that all
constitutional rules should be designed ultimately to produce social
benefits that exceed social costs.77 Within this framework, any
constitutional rule that prohibits the government from performing
some category of action should be premised on the idea that
(a) the costs of such actions are likely greater than their benefits
and (b) the government actors whom the rule restricts cannot be fully
trusted to avoid such harmful action on their own. In this context,
the term constitutional rule does not include only bright-line rules and
textual rules but also judicially managed standards, balancing tests
and case-by-case holdings. While bright-line rules and case-by-case
standards each have their respective advantages,78 the choice between
them is itself a policy decision that does not affect the analysis of
greater-or-nothing rules.
Let us further assume for simplicity that there are two types of
actors in a constitutional system: those that make and apply the
constitutional rules and those that are controlled by them. The former
includes the Constitution’s drafters as well as courts that make,
interpret, and expound particular doctrines of constitutional law.
Among those restricted by the rules are executive and legislative
branches of government that are more responsive to the will of the
people and, in some cases, have particular expertise.
By treating judges as rule makers and focusing on the policy
reasons for rules from their perspective, I do not intend to suggest
that real-world judges are free-wheeling policymakers who are
unconstrained by constitutional authority. We know that they are not
and should not act as such. But for purposes of analyzing the
rationality of rules applied by the judiciary to other branches of
government, it is useful to set aside questions of judicial authority,
textual interpretation, and activism. For these purposes, it does not
matter to what extent particular rules come from constitutional
conventions, constitutional text, previous judicial decisions, or the
courts’ own policy judgments in particular cases. What matters
instead is that the constitutional rules courts apply to other branches
of government should reflect a sound policy judgment regarding the
weaknesses of those restricted branches of government. And if the

77.

For a defense of cost-benefit analysis as an underlying First Amendment
principle, see Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in
First Amendment Analysis, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 737, 740 (2002).

78.

For contrasting views, see Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989) and Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 953 (1995).
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rules do not make sense, they should be changed, whether through
judicial decision or constitutional amendment.
Therefore, when the judiciary enforces constitutional rules against
other branches of government, it should reflect some comparative
advantage that courts have relative to other branches. Granted, for
most decisions made by executive officers and legislators, we trust
that their own policy judgment is superior to that of courts and that
democracy is the best way to ensure that these actors make optimal
decisions. But if this were always true, the judiciary would have no
meaningful role in constitutional law. Judicially enforceable
constitutional rules make sense where the judiciary has some
comparative advantage over more politically responsive government
actors.79
With that framework in place, let us restate the problem of
greater-or-nothing rules in terms of government institutions. Every
enforceable constitutional rule should reflect a policy judgment of
some kind, including a judgment that the restricted branches of
government cannot be trusted to decide some ultimate policy
questions on their own, at least not without judicial review. For
judicial review to make sense, judges must have some kind of
institutional advantage over political branches. But if we could count
on judges to have a complete advantage on the question under review,
then only boundaries are necessary. A judiciary that is wiser on all
components of a decision would either prohibit the reviewable action
or allow it. But it should not need to say to another branch: “The
choice is yours; you may proceed with the suspect action only if you
choose to combine it with some other action.”
If we assume, however, that the judiciary has an advantage on
only some components of a decision, while the other branch retains
advantages on other components, then the advantage of greater-ornothing rules becomes apparent. Much as the rules of a market
economy govern the incentives of private actors without making
ultimate decisions for them in a top-down manner, greater-or-nothing
rules of constitutional law are useful measures to correct the
incentives of government actors without directing them to a
predetermined result.

79.

This was the theme of the famous footnote 4 of United States v. Carlene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (declining to opine as to
“whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”),
as well as in John Hart Ely’s work in Democracy and Distrust. See
generally Ely, supra note 5 (describing constitutional law as a judicial
tool to enhance democratic processes of government rather than
standing in opposition to them).
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B.

Mitigation Rules

The easiest rules to justify by the concept of partial comparative
advantage are mitigation rules. These rules effectively say to a
government actor: “You may go forward only if you take precautions
or otherwise clean up the harm.” These rules work where the rule
maker lacks the information or capacity to say whether the
government should ultimately take a particular course of action (such
as convicting a particular suspect) but does have the capacity to
appreciate the dangers of such actions and the appropriate ways to
mitigate those dangers (such as through a full trial of the evidence).
Judicially imposed mitigation rules make sense where the judiciary
does not know as well as other branches when particular kinds of
government actions are preferable, but does know better than other
branches that (a) government actions of that type do cause material
harm; (b) such harm can be prevented or diminished by additional
government action; and (c) the prevention measures would impose
fewer social costs than their social benefits in the long run. In these
circumstances, a greater-or-nothing mitigation rule should lead to
better outcomes than either simple boundaries or deference alone
could achieve.
C.

Government Would Never Take the Greater Option

In some cases, courts might predict that the enabling option is so
costly to the government that it would never choose it. Such a rule,
therefore, is designed to achieve a particular outcome and functions
similarly to a boundary. For example, courts may have assumed in
creating the traditional public forum doctrine that cities would not
eliminate public parks and sidewalks to avoid public forum
obligations. When this assumption is at work, then we could describe
the rule as a false greater-or-nothing rule. While they purport to offer
choices, the government is never supposed to choose the greater
option, and any time that it does so the rule will have backfired.
This explanation for greater-or-nothing rules is relatively weak for
two reasons. First, if the purpose of a greater-or-nothing rule is to
deter a particular government action in all circumstances, it would be
simpler and more candid for courts to simply prohibit the action.
Second, a prediction that the government would never take the more
harmful greater option could often be mistaken. This error is
especially likely if courts consider the options in all-or-nothing terms
or too narrowly based on the case at hand, without considering the
wide spectrum of ex ante choices that a rule sometimes leaves open
and encourages. For example, while few cities have bulldozed public
sidewalks to avoid First Amendment obligations, it could be that the
public forum doctrine has discouraged cities from building public
sidewalks in areas of new development, causing a loss of free speech
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and other public advantages arising from having government-owned
pedestrian areas.80
D.

Separating Exceptional Cases

A related and better justification for greater-or-nothing rules
could be to deter the government from compromising important
constitutional values except in exceptional cases. This use of a
greater-or-nothing rule supposes a distrust of politically accountable
branches of government in usual cases, but it also supposes that the
political branches are better able than courts at recognizing extreme
situations that justify a change to the normal rules.
Consider the clause of the Constitution that allows Congress to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases of rebellion or invasion.81
The Supreme Court has interpreted this as a greater-or-nothing rule
in the sense that Congress retains the power to suspend habeas corpus
altogether for reasons of public emergency, but does not have more
limited power to reduce the procedural protections of habeas corpus
incrementally while retaining the writ.82 The premise of this legal
system seems to be that judicial review of regulations that alter
(without suspending) habeas corpus is necessary because Congress
and the executive branch cannot be trusted alone to balance interests
of national security against due process values. At the same time,
allowing Congress to suspend the writ assumes that there are some
emergency cases that would justify a deviation from regular due
process and that courts cannot be trusted to exercise habeas corpus
power during such times. The judiciary may not appreciate national
security concerns enough.

80.

See Jennifer Niles Coffin, Note, The United Mall of America: Free
Speech, State Constitutions, and the Growing Fortress of Private
Property, 33 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 615, 617–21 (2000) (describing
the developing trend toward private shopping malls that do not allow
free speech at the expense of traditional public forums).

81.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.

82.

See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787–92 (2008) (holding that the
procedures provided by statute for trying Guantanamo Bay detainees
were constitutionally inadequate as a substitute for habeas corpus).
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It is possible to graph the potential effects of a greater-or-nothing
rule under this set of assumptions. Figure 1 imagines the optimal level
of process for military detainees as a cost-benefit spectrum, ranging
from full due process rights in peacetime to the absence of all process
in times of extreme emergency. Between these extremes, diminished
procedures are optimal at various degrees, as depicted by the
downward sloping curve in the center of the graph. Figure 1 also
shows the spectrum as Congress and the judiciary might erroneously
perceive it; that is, with Congress undervaluing due process and thus
willing to diminish procedures too readily in times of risk, and with
the judiciary failing to appreciate security interests and thus willing
to impose procedures too late. Leaving the full decision to either
Congress or the judiciary would cause a deviation from the optimal
along either of these curves.

Figure 1: Graph depicting the effect of greater-or-nothing rules on the
suspension of habeas corpus.

Finally, Figure 1 depicts in bold how an all-or-nothing rule might
affect outcomes relative to what is optimal and to what Congress or
the judiciary alone would choose. If Congress has no power to
diminish habeas corpus but retains the power to suspend it altogether,
we can predict that it would allow habeas corpus where there is only
modest risk (at a level that the judiciary would control, possibly
above the optimum). But at such point that Congress perceives
enough of an emergency, it would suspend habeas corpus altogether,
driving results below the optimum and possibly below even what
Congress would choose if it were allowed partial options (because
middle options are unavailable). Even though this rule is not perfect,
it could be rational if it is better than the alternatives. If neither
Congress nor the courts can fully be trusted, then there is no rule that
can reach the optimal result in all cases. A rule giving full control to
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the judiciary does best when closer to the peacetime end of the
spectrum, and a rule giving full control to Congress does better at the
emergency end of the spectrum. But only a greater-or-nothing rule
preserves these optimal results at both ends of the spectrum. It does
so, however, by distorting results (in both directions) at the middle of
the spectrum.
In summary, whether a greater-or-nothing rule is best for
separating exceptional cases from a general set of constitutional rules
along a spectrum depends on some key assumptions. First, it depends
on assuming that neither the judiciary nor other branches of
government are capable of balancing the costs and benefits on their
own. Second, it depends on whether most scenarios are likely to be
near the extremes on the spectrum of potential conditions and
choices, where outcomes are improved by a greater-or-nothing rule
relative to the alternatives.
E.

Baseline Decisions

Greater-or-nothing rules might also work where the government
has made background decisions that the judiciary uses to infer
optimal results. This creates a potential for distorting the incentives
of government actors, but if there is no other effective way to enforce
a particular constitutional standard, it might be the best available
option. Such rules work better if the government decisions to which
the Constitution is tied are relatively inelastic, such that the
attachment of constitutional consequences to such decisions is likely
to cause little change.
One could justify the public forum doctrine in this way. Perhaps
what the First Amendment ideally would require is for the
government to provide the optimal quantity of locations for public
speech, but this principle would be impossible for the judiciary to
enforce as a boundary rule without taking over the details of local
land-use planning. As a next best option, the judiciary might choose
to infer that where the government has deemed an area optimal for
public pedestrian traffic, the area is also optimal for public speech.
Courts might further assume that where a city has not made a place
available as a public sidewalk or park, it would be too costly to make
it available for speech. Although this assumption will not always be
accurate, it could be more accurate than the judicially available
alternatives. Another doctrine that could fit this rationale is the rule
that habeas corpus applies only to noncitizen detainees in areas under
U.S. sovereign control.83 This doctrine relies on the government’s
baseline decisions as to the placement of alien detainees (whether to
83.

See id. at 764–66 (discussing the federal government’s position that the
Constitution had no effect in Guantanamo Bay with regard to
noncitizens because the United States had disclaimed sovereignty there).
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move them to U.S. sovereign areas after capturing them) as an
indication of whether habeas corpus would do more harm than good.
The skewing effect of these kinds of rules are less significant if the
baseline government decisions are costly to change relative to the bias
that the doctrine serves to correct. A public forum doctrine that
would require the government to tear up public sidewalks and
physically devote the space to something else is preferable to one that
would allow the government to get around the rule by merely
changing the form of its ownership.84 The more elastic the
government’s baseline decisions are, and the more biased the
government is likely to be on the constitutional question under
review, the more likely this kind of rule would backfire and cause
more harm than good.
F.

Comparative Decisions

Greater-or-nothing rules can also improve government decision
making by tying biased government decisions to comparable decisions
lacking in bias. This principle often works for rules that disfavor
discrimination or underinclusiveness. By forcing the government to
choose to act on all or none of a particular classification in the same
manner, courts allow those branches of government with primary
expertise to assess the costs and benefits that are beyond judicial
competence while correcting for some known flaw in the government’s
cost-benefit function. In this way, a better outcome would result than
if either the court or the elected branch of government were acting
alone.
Consider how the Supreme Court has interpreted the First
Amendment to strongly disfavor content-based speech regulations.85
One need not believe that there is something inherently wrong with
government favoritism for some kinds of speech to support the
greater-or-nothing approach that the Supreme Court has infused into
First Amendment law.86 A cost-benefit approach to the freedom of
speech supports the judiciary’s use of an antidiscrimination approach
to First Amendment analysis as well. Under a cost-benefit approach,
a court’s job in reviewing a speech regulation is essentially to
determine whether a regulation that inhibits some person’s speech is
socially important enough to outweigh the loss of freedom that it
84.

See Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C., v. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Las
Vegas, 257 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that transferring title
to public sidewalks, while retaining a public easement, does not avoid
the public forum doctrine).

85.

See supra notes 35–45 and accompanying text.

86.

There are many environments in which the government is allowed to
discriminate on the basis of content or even viewpoint. See Fee, supra
note 35, at 1136–48 (describing areas of permissible content
discrimination).
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causes. But given the many kinds of regulations that can burden
speech and the many variables that regulators understand better than
courts on such matters, it is often dangerous for courts to secondguess directly whether particular regulations are important enough to
outweigh their costs. Fortunately, courts can predict that government
regulators are more likely to be biased against speech interests when
they know precisely what speech they are regulating. Conversely,
courts can reasonably infer from the breadth of a regulation that the
government’s interests are more likely credible and substantial;
otherwise, the government would not be willing to inhibit speech that
it favors along with all other speech. In this sense, rules favoring
content neutrality are an aid to judicial review indirectly indicating
(from the consistency of the regulator’s own decisions) what interests
are important. Such rules also have a positive effect on the incentives
of regulators. Encouraging the government to regulate speech broadly
or not at all tends to correct its inherent biases, causing it to more
accurately strike the optimal balance between speech interests and
regulatory interests.
Understanding the greater-or-nothing feature of free speech law as
a tool of judicial review aimed toward improving government
decisions also helps to explain why there are exceptions to the rules
favoring content neutrality. There are times where courts allow
content-based regulations and times that they disallow contentneutral ones, indicating that neutrality is not the goal of First
Amendment law for its own sake and that sometimes courts are
confident enough to declare some categories of regulation
unconstitutional or constitutional without relying on indicators of
content neutrality.87 First Amendment law is a patchwork of
boundary rules and greater-or-nothing rules, not because the law is
lacking in principles, but because boundaries and greater-or-nothing
rules have different kinds of advantages.
We can see the same greater-or-nothing principle behind other
antidiscrimination rules of constitutional law, including those relating
to the Equal Protection Clause, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and
the Free Exercise Clause. In each of these areas, a rule that requires
equivalent treatment of people, ideas, or institutions—in defined
situations—can make sense as a way of dividing responsibility
between courts and elected government institutions, using the
government’s decisions in less biased situations to infer the proper
results in more biased situations. Whether or not one accepts equality
as a fundamental value in our constitutional system, it is a highly

87.

See id. at 1107–13 (describing speech maximization and
antidiscrimination as two competing values that are inherent in cases
involving freedom of speech).
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useful tool of judicial review for assessing whether other branches of
government are doing their job well enough.
G.

Comparative Terms

A parallel principle of judiciary review can illuminate rules that
prohibit government deals with unconstitutional conditions. As
described earlier, rules against unconstitutional conditions are greateror-nothing rules because they presume to allow the government a
choice to grant or deny some opportunity categorically but prohibit it
from offering the opportunity under only specified conditions (such as
that affected individual pays the government officer a bribe).
Constitutional rules that prohibit some kinds of conditions make sense
if they are ways of gauging, from the judiciary’s perspective of limited
information, whether the government has a sufficient interest to
support even the limited restriction or denial of benefit that it
threatens to impose. In many fields of government activity, courts
cannot tell directly when the government should offer or deny an
opportunity to some regulated individual; but this judicial
disadvantage does not prevent courts from seeing that certain
conditions are likely to distort the government regulator’s decisions in
ways that undermine the usual principles of deference. Accordingly,
when courts require the government to disperse certain benefits or
regulatory exemptions in an all-or-nothing fashion, without suspect
conditions attached, it improves that process of government decision
making.
The Supreme Court’s approach to the Takings Clause in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission88 and Dolan v. City of Tigard89 is an
example of this principle at work. In Nollan and Dolan, the Supreme
Court held that the government may not use conditions on land-use
permits to coerce property owners to cede property rights to the
government except in narrow situations. Land-use exactions of private
property are valid only when the requested property interest would
(a) redress specific impacts that the land development would
otherwise cause (such as the property would serve infrastructure
needs of the new proposed community) and (b) be proportional to
those impacts.90 This rule works under the assumption that courts
88.

483 U.S. 825 (1987).

89.

512 U.S. 374 (1994).

90.

Nolan, 483 U.S. at 836–37 (“[U]nless the permit condition serves the
same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building
restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan
of extortion’”); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“If petitioner’s proposed
development had somehow encroached on existing greenway space in the
city, it would have been reasonable to require petitioner to provide some
alternative greenway space for the public either on her property or
elsewhere.”) (citing Nolan, 483 U.S. at 836).
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should typically defer to the government’s assessment of costs and
benefits when they regulate land use. But the rule also assumes that
when a government equivocates in such a way that it introduces a
potential benefit to itself that ideally should be irrelevant, then
judicial deference is improper. Compared to what regulators were
doing, the Nollan-Dolan rule cuts for and against property owners. It
surely causes some regulators to favor property owners by allowing
land use unconditionally, but also causes other governments to favor
regulatory interests by denying land use proposals categorically
(because the benefits of improper exactions are not available). Either
way, if the rule’s assumptions are accurate, the rule should make the
government’s decisions more reliable.
H.

Disclosure Rules

Yet another type of greater-or-nothing constitutional rule requires
the government to add public procedures, disclosures, or statements
to reach an ultimate decision that it admittedly has the power to
reach. While such rules sometimes seem toothless and wasteful, they
make sense where one assumes that government decision-making is
improved by informed public oversight. When the judiciary imposes
such rules, it need not understand the particular costs and benefits of
government decisions, but rather it only needs to predict that
government actors are likely to have some biases that informed voters
do not share to the same degree. Disclosure rules therefore can nudge
government decisions toward what would please informed voters.
The government-speech doctrine of the First Amendment seems
to work in this manner, as do rules affecting public education and
limited public forums. In some environments, the government can
favor speech on the basis of content and even viewpoint, contrary to
the usual rules, if it is willing to declare in clear terms that the very
purpose of the program involves the kind of speech preference in
question.91 This supposes that government speech discrimination is
sometimes worth its cost, but it also supposes that government actors
are likely to do too much of it if allowed to discriminate under the
public radar. What otherwise seems like a doctrinal loophole makes
sense if one considers political influence to sometimes be valuable in
achieving a well-functioning marketplace of ideas. A similar principle
can arguably justify many other judge-made rules that enforce
constitutional values, including federalism, freedom of religion, and
criminal procedure.

91.

See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472–81
(2009) (holding that government acceptance of privately donated
monuments for a public park was government speech and did not
require acceptance on a content-neutral basis).
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IV. Greater-or-Nothing Rules in a Complex Society
The justifications for greater-or-nothing rules discussed in the last
section share a common assumption: that there are some
constitutional principles that courts are ill equipped to enforce as
direct boundaries on government actors in other branches. Because we
know that the judiciary has its own weaknesses, often the best rule is
one that simply defers to other branches. But where government
actors are known to be biased in predictable ways, deference can also
lead to poor results. Greater-or-nothing rules provide a third
alternative. Typically they require suspect government actions to be
tied to other government actions in ways that are calculated to
improve the decision maker’s incentives. The judiciary often makes
these rules where its own institutional advantages enable it to identify
weaknesses in government decision making that can be corrected in
small ways. Greater-or-nothing rules are a way to use the advantages
of courts and other branches of government to achieve results better
than either could achieve alone.
If comparative differences of courts and other branches of
government explain why many greater-or-nothing rules exist, such
differences also provide a powerful explanation for why courts have
been increasingly turning to rules of this type. Greater-or-nothing
rules tend to work best in environments in which the courts are least
able to appreciate all of the effects of their decisions. This will more
likely be true as society becomes more complex and diverse.
A century ago the economy was relatively simple. Most
Americans were farmers, business relationships were simple, and we
had few complex regulatory structures. Perhaps this is why the
judiciary of that era imposed its own economic vision on the political
branches in a more direct manner in the form of constitutional
boundaries rules, including substantive due process limits, the
Commerce Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, ways that the
Court avoids today.
The same could be said of changes in culture, ethical values, and
religion. A century ago, Americans were far more homogenous, such
that it probably seemed natural for the Supreme Court to enforce
ideals such as the freedom of speech and freedom of religion through
boundaries based on common social assumptions of what is religion
and what is valuable speech. As society has become more diverse and
lacking on consensus, this undoubtedly has become a more difficult
job for judges to perform. Increasingly, they have responded by
abandoning the old boundary principles in favor of newer structural
constitutional principles that manage the process of democracy rather
than its results.

128

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 1·2013
Greater-or-Nothing Constitutional Rules

Seen in this way, greater-or-nothing rules are what Richard
Epstein might call simple rules for a complex society92 or what
Michael Polanyi might call decentralized rules for a spontaneous
system of order.93 Both authors describe how the more complicated a
system becomes, the more necessary it is to govern outcomes through
simple, decentralized rules that referee independently motivated
actors rather than through result-oriented, top-down governance of a
hierarchical chain of command.94 They are rules for divided authority,
which can have enormous advantages in terms of efficiency and
accuracy over centralized systems of authority.95 While Epstein,
Polanyi, and Zywicki are primarily concerned with how the
government should regulate private actors in an increasingly complex
market economy,96 the same insight can explain the relationship
between the judiciary and other branches of government. Greater-ornothing constitutional rules enable a decentralized system of
government, analogous to a decentralized economy. And like a market
economy, a decentralized government with proper structural
incentives can more effectively improve the public welfare on a wider
range of policy areas than any single hierarchical system could
accomplish.
Thus, as society becomes more complex and diverse, it is natural
for the judiciary to apply greater-or-nothing rules more often. At the
same time, we should not become so comfortable with such rules as to
lose sight of the assumptions that make them work. Nor must we
assume that they are categorical imperatives such that we should
ignore their consequences. There remain situations where greater-or92.

EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 53–149 (proposing simple rules in the areas of
autonomy and property; contract; torts; necessity, coordination, and
just compensation; and take and pay).

93.

Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and
Rejoinders 159 (1951) (“When order is achieved among human beings
by allowing them to interact with each other on their own initiative—
subject only to laws which uniformly apply to all of them—we have a
system of spontaneous order in society.”).

94.

See Epstein, supra note 6, at 21 (“The proper response to more complex
societies should be an ever greater reliance on simple legal rules, including
older rules too often and too easily dismissed as curious relics of some
bygone horse-and-buggy age.”); Zywicki, supra note 7, at 144–46
(summarizing and supplementing Polanyi’s argument that a decentralized
model of spontaneous order is essential for complex systems)

95.

See Epstein, supra note 6, at 30–36 (discussing the ability of simple
rules to balance administrative cost and the risk of erroneous
incentives); Zywicki, supra note 7, at 147 (discussing the benefits offered
by simple rules of general applicability, including longevity,
predictability, and allowance for individual discretion)

96.

See generally Zywicki, supra note 7, at 147 (discussing the impact of legal
rules on individual actors within a larger system, such as the economy).
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nothing rules could be inferior to either complete judicial deference or
judicial scrutiny of final outcomes. It is further possible that some
existing rules could be tweaked and improved while retaining their
structure. Understanding the phenomenon, structure, and types of
greater-or-nothing rules should make it easier to analyze them and
ensure that they work as they should.
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